A Mean Streak in U.S. Foreign Policy

By Joseph E. Mulligan, S.J.

"F___ Saddam. We're taking him out." Thus spoke President George W. Bush in March 2002, upon dropping into the office of National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice (Time Online Edition, March 23, 2003). The president delivered this candid comment when Rice was meeting with three U.S. senators — they were discussing how to deal with Iraq through the United Nations, or perhaps in a coalition with America's Middle East allies.

"Bush wasn't interested," Time noted. "He waved his hand dismissively, recalls a participant, and neatly summed up his Iraq policy in that short phrase. The senators laughed uncomfortably; Rice flashed a knowing smile. The president left the room."

Civilian carnage in iraq

Now fast-forward to Iraq in March 2003, where some U.S. Marines are venting bitter satisfaction as they survey a scene of mass civilian carnage at Nasiriya — the result of their spraying a vehicle and people with heavy fire. "The Iraqis are sick people and we are the chemotherapy," said a corporal. "I am starting to hate this country. Wait till I get hold of a friggin' Iraqi. No, I won't get hold of one. I'll just kill him."

The U.S. troops had just suffered some of their worst casualties in the invasion, including the killing of some of their buddies by Iraqis who appeared to want to surrender but then displayed sub-machine guns and started shooting at close range.

The American soldiers replied in kind but went one step further: slaughtering civilians, twelve of them, including a baby and a five-year-old, according to a reporter from The Times (UK), in his article entitled "U.S. Marines Turn Fire on Civilians at the Bridge of Death" (March 30, 2003).

Clinton policies "feckless"

Next, consider the discourse of Richard Perle, then chairman of the Defense Policy Board, on PBS Frontline in mid-October 2001. PBS: "Jim Woolsey [former CIA director] told us basically he considers that the last decade of actions, in regards specifically to Iraq, has been feckless. What's your opinion about the policies they developed and why they developed in the way they have?"

Perle responded: "Jim's certainly right that the policies were feckless. Saddam Hussein plots the assassination of a former American president. The American response: a cruise missile, in an unoccupied intelligence headquarters. And before the dust had cleared from that missile attack, American officials were at great pains to explain that we had deliberately chosen the middle of the night so nobody would be hurt. We looked ridiculous; we looked ineffective; we looked weak. Saddam must have enjoyed that night."

Perle considered the effort by U.S. officials to avoid the loss of human life as an example of the Clinton administration’s "fecklessness" in dealing with Saddam Hussein. It made us look ridiculous and weak. What Perle is saying here is that U.S. military efforts to respect human life are to be objects of ridicule today.

Perhaps President Bush learned a new f-word if he listened to the Perle interview. Maybe he figured he would not be feckless if he used another, more familiar, f-word regarding what he wanted to do to Saddam.

But more importantly, how does such language by Bush and Perle and others influence the emotions and behavior of soldiers such as the Marine corporal who also used an f-word while expressing his hatred of the "friggin" Iraqis whom he unabashedly wanted to kill? He may never have heard the statements by Bush and Perle, but he probably had picked up from this administration a certain mean streak in its attitude and its style of speaking.

Richard Perle on the UN

In a PBS-TV interview by Ben Wattenberg on Nov. 14, 2002, Perle gave a particularly blunt expression of disdain for the United Nations. Speaking of a mistaken realism, he said: "the realism of the diplomats in which you put great confidence in the United Nations, that corrupt and weak and ineffective institution, that’s not realism. That’s not even idealism. It’s just plain stupid."

It is not just the gutter talk and gangster language and the ridiculing of efforts to abide by the rules of war which can influence the attitudes of Marine corporals and of all of us regarding peoples who are suddenly labeled our "enemies." The polite, sophisticated talk of "preemptive war," of controlling the world’s resources, of preventing the growth of any military power in any region of the globe which may rival U.S. superiority, of fixing the limits on the kind of government which an occupied people may democratically choose (e.g., no theocracy in Iraq) — all these ways of speaking contain within them a kind of violence, a willingness to subjugate others, an arrogance of power, and a spirit of meanness.

President Bush at West Point

As an example, consider Bush’s speech at the June 1, 2002, West Point commencement. "Our security will require transforming the military you will lead — a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world," he said. Those who threaten the U.S. are from the "dark" corners of the world.

"And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives. (Applause.)" Thus the notion of "preemptive" action, which others subsequently saw as aggression, becomes a commonplace in public discourse.

"We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. (Applause.) …And we will lead the world in opposing it." This perfect expression of his simplistic world-view gives license to Americans to use any means necessary to wipe out "evil."

For that, the U.S. will not allow any military rivals to approximate our strength. "America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge — (applause) — thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace." This means we will knock them out of the box before they get close. We will remain the bully of the block.

Bush described the "single surviving model of human progress" as one based on "limits on the power of the state and respect for private property." In his view, economic freedom also means free trade, free markets, and privatization — a system in which American capital is dominant.

"America cannot impose this vision — yet we can support and reward governments that make the right choices for their own people… An advancing nation will pursue economic reform, to unleash the great entrepreneurial energy of its people." We know what is right for others, and we will exert pressure so that the world recognizes what is best for itself.

Historically the U.S. has always promoted this kind of "economic freedom." The military intervention in Iraq is just the most recent, and one of the most blatant, uses of force to build a new nation whose markets are "free" and whose resources are open to foreign ownership — "privatized" for the benefit of Western capital.

George Kennan: "Dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming"

While U.S. politicians and business leaders usually wrap their public discourse in high-sounding rhetoric, tough talk about economic self-interest sometimes can be heard. In 1948 George F. Kennan, then head of the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff, took off the gloves and delivered a remarkably candid proposal for U.S. strategy: "We have about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its population. This disparity is particularly great as between ourselves and the peoples of Asia. In this situation we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment.

"Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives.

"We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of altruism and world benefaction. [....] We should cease to talk about such vague and — for the Far East — unreal objectives as human rights, the raising of living standards and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better" (Document PPS23, February 24, 1948).

The history of U.S. military intervention since then shows that Kennan’s no-nonsense approach was taken to heart by successive administrations. The current one certainly is unhampered by idealistic slogans, although in public it may mouth them frequently, often combined with vague but fervent references to God.

Defense Planning Guidance (1992)

One of the most arrogant statements of U.S. goals is found in the Defense Planning Guidance, a draft policy statement prepared in 1992 by Paul Wolfowitz, then Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, then Wolfowitz’ deputy. Wolfowitz is now the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Libby serves as Vice-President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff and national security adviser.

This document on America’s mission in the post-Cold War era circulated for several weeks at top levels in the Pentagon but became controversial when it was leaked to The New York Times and the Washington Post ("U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop" by Patrick E. Tyler, The New York Times, March 8, 1992). Then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney was ordered to rewrite it.

The document intended to outline the new role of the U.S. as the world’s only superpower. "This Defense Planning guidance addresses the fundamentally new situation which has been created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disintegration of the internal as well as the external empire, and the discrediting of Communism as an ideology with global pretensions and influence," the authors explain.

"Our first objective," the document says plainly, "is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia."

Three additional aspects of this objective are presented: "First the U.S must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that holds the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role."

The U.S. should "encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems." Here, as we find frequently in official discourse, references to democracy are coupled with talk about open or free economies, as if the latter gave the true definition of the former.

"While the U.S. cannot become the world’s ‘policeman,’ by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong," the authors acknowledge, "we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations.

"Various types of U.S. interests may be involved in such instances: access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict, and threats to U.S. society from narcotics trafficking." Access to Persian Gulf oil is considered a primary U.S. concern.

Other countries may be tempted to develop a "defense" posture of domination, but the U.S. alone is allowed that prerogative. "There are other potential nations or coalitions that could, in the further future, develop strategic aims and a defense posture of region-wide or global domination. Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any future potential global competitor."

The U.S. will support the former Soviet Union’s "successor states (especially Russia and Ukraine) in their efforts to become peaceful democracies with market-based economies." Again, we note that permanent (though not logically necessary) association of a political system with a specific way of structuring the economy.

Turning to Western Europe, the document states that "NATO continues to provide the indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe. Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security as well as the channel for U.S. influence and participation in European security affairs. While the United States supports the goal of European integration, we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO, particularly the alliance’s integrated command structure." Europe should not get uppity and conceive of its own independent military system without (dominant) U.S. participation.

Regarding the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the document affirms that "our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region’s oil."

The document states that what is most important is "the sense that the world order is ultimately backed by the U.S." and that "the United States should be postured to act independently when collective action cannot be orchestrated" or in a crisis that calls for quick response.

This document contains the roots of the current "preemptive attack" doctrine. "The U.S. may be faced with the question of whether to take military steps to prevent the development or use of weapons of mass destruction," it states, noting that those steps could include preempting an impending attack with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.

Project for a New American Century

In 1997 Paul Wolfowitz and "Scooter" Libby were joined by Elliott Abrams, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and others as signers of the Statement of Principles of the Project for a New American Century, in which clear echoes of Wolfowitz’ Defense Planning Guidance can be heard.

The statement begins by chiding some conservatives for not having "fought for a defense budget that would maintain American security and advance American interests in the new century. We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership.

"As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world's preeminent power… Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests?

"...We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities.

"...The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership."

The statement calls for a significant increase in defense spending. Moreover, "we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values; we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad; we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.

"Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next."

The Reaganite policy is back home in today’s White House, and many of the signers of the New American Century statement are there with it. They will continue to identify democracy with free-market capitalism, as Secretary of State Colin Powell did on NBC’s Meet the Press (May 4, 2003): When asked whether the U.S. is thinking "about liberating the people of Cuba the way we’ve liberated the people of Iraq," Powell responded: "Well, we do not believe that it is appropriate at this time to consider, if you’re talking of military force, to use military force for this particular purpose." That short phrase, "at this time," reveals a vast arrogance. "We believe that Cuba is isolated. Cuba is the anachronism that I mentioned a few moments ago."

In the next breath Powell expressed the curious view that years ago revolutionary Cuba was preaching "Communist theology," and he fell right in line with his neo-conservative colleagues in identifying the democratic community with the "free trade area of the Americas." "I remember 15 years ago," Powell reflected, "when I was national security adviser, and Cuba was fomenting revolution and Communist ideology and theology all over the hemisphere. Fifteen years later, every nation in the hemisphere has rejected that point of view. They’re all finding their own way down a democratic path, with market reforms. They want to be part of a community of democracies of the Americas, they want to be part of a free trade area of the Americas."

Tough hope

From its style of speaking to its way of behaving, the Bush administration shows a mean streak which indeed has always been present in U.S. foreign policy (e.g., George Kennan, 1948) but which is now being flaunted shamelessly.

It is essential that Christians involved in peace and justice efforts be unflinching in looking at the structural sin embedded in U.S. policy (e.g., the idolatries of greed and supernationalism) and at the same time organize intelligently and perseveringly to change that policy.

Way back in 1961 Trappist monk and social prophet Thomas Merton urged us to hope "doggedly" for whatever improvements may be possible: "We will never get anywhere unless we can accept the fact that politics is an inextricable tangle of good and evil motives in which, perhaps, the evil predominate but where one must continue to hope doggedly in what little good can still be found…" ("The Root of War is Fear," reprinted in National Catholic Reporter, April 4, 2003).

Some day, some century, that "little good" must become a new creation, God’s kingdom of justice and peace. We must struggle as hard for that goal as the business executives in the administration work for theirs.

Joseph E. Mulligan, a Jesuit priest from Detroit, works in Nicaragua with Christian base communities. His book, The Nicaraguan Church and The Revolution, was published by Sheed & Ward in 1991. In 1994 Joe published The Jesuit Martyrs Of El Salvador — Celebrating the Anniversaries (Baltimore: Fortkamp), about the six Jesuits and two women massacred at the University of Central America in 1989. He may be reached by email at mull@ibw.com.ni